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1. Introduction 
Driving a train in the urban environment to provide a passenger rail service is a 
particularly complex task (Branton, 1979), and train drivers of metropolitan rail 
systems (MRSs) work in highly dynamic socio-technical settings (Naweed, 2013). 
Research has shown that drivers function in a state of current and immediate 
knowledge of the driving environment. In the literature it has been described as the 
state of ‘now’ (Hamilton and Clarke, 2005), where they try and meet multiple and often 
contradictory goals (Borrion et al, 2014; Lee et al., 2008). 
In recent times train drivers have been increasingly relied upon by their companies to 
perform security tasks that did not form a part of the traditional train driving job profile. 
The reason behind this is the growing threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
to urban passenger rail where the number of people killed by terrorists using bombs 
has been steadily growing in the last two decades (Strandberg, 2013).  
The Railway Safety and Standards Board (2002) of UK listed the primary goals of 
train drivers as follows: Ensure safety (this duty takes priority over all other duties); 
Maintain the schedule of the service (as far as possible), and if the above are covered; 
and Improve energy efficiency of service delivery and passenger comfort, while 
respecting standard operating procedures set by the railways union. 
Security is not listed as a primary goal, and little research has been conducted on 
train drivers’ responsibility towards the security of passengers and their companies’ 
assets. Research into security has been limited for two reasons. Firstly, many of the 
security systems in MRSs have only been recently employed following a surge in 
terrorist incidents in the last few decades. Secondly, data from security procedures 
are not easily available to researchers because they are often sensitive and even 
classified (Kraemer, Carayon and Sanquist, 2009). 
Models of train driving behaviour have concentrated on safely and punctuality by 
studying how train drivers manage multiple workloads such as time pressure, 
cognitive demands of procedural tasks and behavioural conflict between tasks.  
Security needs its own specialist set of studies for the following reasons: 
 Accident risks related to safety procedures are for the most part known to train 
drivers. For example, they are connected to the regular characteristics of the 
system (e.g., brake failure, missing a signal on the track)—and can be localized 
due to continuous experiential learning. Security risks, on the other hand, are 
generally related to a potentially unknown external actor that, for the purposes of 
creating terror, might carry out random attacks. To that extent there is lack of 
reliable knowledge amongst train drivers about the nature and degree of risk 
posed by security threats. 
 In security operations false and nuisance alarms are inherent to procedures 
(Kraemer, Carayon and Sanquist, 2009). Unlike in case of safety, train drivers are 
aware that security procedures are often performed with no certainty about the 
reality of the threat. Reports of suspicious items on trains almost always turn out 
to be innocuous (Peterman, 2007). 
 Security domain is unique in that the immediate consequences of both excellent 
and poor implementation of procedures can be identical – that nothing happens, 
as long as there is no malicious actor present to exploit the weaknesses. 
Therefore, security procedures can be more susceptible to incubation of mishaps 
(Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) than safety. 
 Performance of security procedures is a socio-technical task that requires train 
drivers to interact with passengers and is not limited to performing a set of purely 
technical tasks like braking or speed control. 
This study was conducted in a Metro Rail System (MRS) in South Asia to better 
understand the nuances, and context-shaping features of multiple goal management 
by train drivers in responding to reports of a suspicious item on a moving train.  
The MRS operated under a constant threat of terrorist attacks using IEDs, and on 
average train drivers responded to five reports of suspicious items every week. They 
were expected to follow a specific 20-step standard operating procedure (SOP) to 
assist the management of the item (usually its removal) through coordination with 
members of the Operations Control Centre (OCC) and the station team (Tripathi and 
Borrion, 2016). Discussion with other operators suggest this procedure is now widely 
adopted across MRSs in the region. 
 
  
2. Material and Methods 
2.1. Research approach 
The study required an approach capable of eliciting knowledge of a highly skilled work 
process from train drivers. Other studies in this domain have shown that this type of 
knowledge is difficult to extract because it is wielded tacitly (Shadbolt, 2005) through 
repetition, and rapid and automated actions in a dynamic work environment (Naweed, 
Bye and Hockey, 2007).  The literature endorses converging multiple techniques as 
the best method for eliciting expert knowledge in these real world environments 
(Hoffman and Lintern, 2006). Thus, the study adopted a mixed methods approach 
involving observation of work in a simulator and cab rides, observation of work using 
videos and training media, focus groups interviews, and one-to-one interviews with 
experts. The field work was conducted over a six-month period with an exploratory 
and ‘bootstrapped’ research approach as part of a longer research project into 
conduct of security procedures on MRSs. 
2.1.1 Observation of work in a simulator and cab rides  
The MRS where the research was conducted used a fixed platform train-driving 
simulator for training purposes. The simulator was built to specifications of a real life 
train driving cab, with similar controls and sounds that mimicked a real train. The 
software in the simulator depicted the actual train driving route, and a typical practice 
session for a train driver in the simulator lasted 45 to 50 minutes. 
Observation of drivers was undertaken in the simulator, and in three cab rides on 
actual trains. Notes about train driving were taken and three informal interviews were 
performed with train drivers while they were driving the simulated train, and through 
observation of work during the train ride. The direct methods of talking to the drivers 
and watching them at work were used to conceptualise the issue in the problem 
domain (Cooke, 1994), and as a means of framing the ensuing focus groups. 
2.1.2. Observation of work using videos and training media 
The researchers also viewed several hours of video footage of train drivers operating 
trains on the network. Data in the form of industry documentation were also obtained 
and included training media, and route diagrams. The training media were classroom 
presentations, text books, and copies of the security procedure that were given to all 
train drivers during the year-long training session at the MRS. 
2.1.3. Focus groups 
A total of six focus groups were conducted with 5 train drivers in each group, resulting 
in a total sample of 30 drivers. Each session with the focus groups lasted 
approximately one hour. Table 1 shows an overview of the focus group protocol that 
was used to structure the interviews.  
TABLE 1 GOES HERE 
 
2.2. Participants 
Thirty train drivers (male = 28; female = 2) gave informed consent to participate in the 
study. Their age was in the range of 24 to 34 years, with a mean age and median age 
of approximately 26 years. Given that the retirement age is sixty in this country, this 
convenient sample was therefore relatively young. 
The participants had volunteered to take part in the study from a total pool of sixty 
drivers who were working for this organisation. At the time of the study the participants 
had undergone twelve month classroom training to prepare them in driving MRS 
trains, another six months training on a simulator to gain train driving experience 
(Range: 40 to 45 h, Mdn = 42 h, Mean = 42.25 h, SD = 1.72), spent three months on 
trial runs where they drove MRS trains without any passengers, and another six 
months driving the MRS trains in real life working conditions with passengers on 
board.  
Both during their classroom training, and while driving the simulated train, the 
participants rehearsed various SOPs, including the procedure corresponding to the 
report of a suspicious item on the train.In real life working conditions all the 
participants had received the report of a suspicious item on the train at least once, 
with a maximum of six reports received by two participants.  
 
2.3. Ethical issues 
The researchers were aware that the participants in the focus groups would discuss 
deliberate rule violations, make comments critical of procedures framed by the 
management, and admit to their inability to meet all the demands of their job. 
Therefore, every care was taken to ensure that the responses could not be traced 
back to individual participants. The participants were informed that their names would 
be removed from individual data units, and specific comments that could 
unintentionally identify a participant were not reported verbatim in the dataset. 
 
3. Theory/Calculation 
3.1. Data transcription 
The foundation of the focus group sessions was a specially designed scenario 
simulation task adapted from route invention task technique to elicit knowledge from 
train drivers (Naweed and Rainbird, 2014). The task was introduced 15 minutes after 
the start of the interview, and required each participant to generate a hypothetical 
scenario starting with the report of a suspicious item from a passenger while driving 
a train. The participant then voiced details of situational assessment, goals that they 
were expected to fulfil, strategies adopted to meet those goals, decision points in the 
process, trade-offs between goals, and rule violations. Each participant walked 
through the scenario in a mix of English and the local vernacular language with the 
rest of the group listening and contributing their viewpoint through comments. 
By asking participants to simulate their role in such a scenario, the task stimulated 
knowledge acquisition from situational insight. It drew on principles from the Critical 
Decision Method (Klein et al., 1989), describing the steps in problem solving on the 
way (Cooke, 1994). The ‘invention task’ technique has been used by researchers to 
study Signal Passed At Danger (SPAD) scenarios, and gaining insight into driver 
decision-making in multiple environments of urban commuter rail, passenger trains, 
and freight rail (Naweed and Rainbird, 2014). 
Transcripts were generated for each of the six focus groups, resulting in thirty 
individual scenarios describing what drivers would do following the report of a 
suspicious item on board by a passenger. The entire dataset was collected by a single 
individual. The participants’ statements were recorded verbatim. Because the 
sentences included words in the local vernacular language as well as in English, all 
the quotes were first translated into English and the grammatical structure improved 
in several cases. Although all efforts were made to keep the original meaning, some 
of  the nuances in the sentences could have been lost in translation. No information 
was added, however, and we do not feel the message was significantly changed. 
3.2. Data analysis 
The analysis followed a process of open coding, category development, and thematic 
coding.  Categories were drawn from the open coding process, including coding of 
phrases, comments and features of the transcripts, which grounded findings in the 
data (Huberman and Miles, 1994). Qualitative analysis methods have been used to 
study performance of operatives in the railway domain in safety studies (Naweed et 
al, 2012; Stanton and Walker, 2011). The purpose of the analytical process was to 
present the findings in a clear model of explanation. There were38 units found in the 
data. The units were used to develop categories that were grouped into themes. 
Figure 1 represents the key themes that emerged for managing reports of suspicious 
items on a moving train and the units of analysis.  
 
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE 
 
The themes were then used to answer the research question identified in the 
introduction: 
What are the nuances, and context shaping features of multiple goal management by 
train drivers in responding to reports of a suspicious item on a moving train? 
The analysis was carried out using the Delphi technique, a widely used and accepted 
method for achieving convergence of findings concerned with real-world expert 
knowledge (Hsu, 2007).  
While the overarching themes were derived deductively, analysis within each of the 
themes was inductive (following Glaser & Strauss 1967). Table 2 gives a non-
exhaustive list of primary theoretical sources that were used to draw overarching 
themes using deductive knowledge, and accompanying inductive findings from the 
data. 
TABLE 2 GOES HERE 
 
3.2. Data validation 
Data validity was assessed by a reference group of subject-matter experts. This 
approach has already been used in studies involving train driver data (Naweed et al, 
2013; Naweed and Balakrishnan, 2012). A panel of five train driving instructors with 
a minimum experience of ten years in driving trains reviewed the coding, category 
development, and thematic analysis of the data. Experience gained throughout ten 
years of practice conferred on them the status of experts in this field (Ericsson et al., 
1993). They crosschecked the data analysis in multiple rounds to ensure consistency 
in the process.  
 
4. Results 
The collected data provide critical insights into how train drivers of the MRS were 
managing reports of suspicious items on a train. The analysis revealed four major 
themes: 
1) Perceived pressure from multiple goals in conducting the security procedure, which 
featured in 93% or 28 out of 30 scenarios. 
2)  Perceived conflicts between goals, which featured in 83% or 25 out of 30 scenarios 
3) Relationship between perceived pressure from goals and the conditions within 
which the security procedure was expected to be performed, which featured in 90% 
or 27 out of 30 scenarios 
4) Perceived effort in performing a task in the security procedure, which featured in 
76% or 23 out of 30 scenarios 
These themes and the subordinate categories are represented in Figure 1. Each of 
the themes is discussed and sample data (direct quotes of participants) is provided 
in support where necessary.  
 
4.1. Goals 
4.1.1. Individual Goals 
The drivers considered certain parts of the security procedure closely aligned to their 
primary role as a train driver, and therefore were self-motivated to make no errors in 
those parts of the procedure. One driver described the task of stopping the train at 
the station as follows: “I have to stop the train at exactly the right spot on the track 
dozens of times every day. It is something that I should be able to do without error 
even in my sleep. It is a basic part of train driving irrespective of whether it is part of 
a security procedure or not.” 
At an individual level, the drivers also feared penalty or censure from the management 
if they made errors on certain other parts of the procedure. Penalty in the form of 
formal warning given by managers, issuance of a show-cause notice, loss of pay, 
suspension from work for a certain period of time, and in extreme cases even 
dismissal from service were listed by drivers as negative consequences of failure to 
perform certain tasks in the security procedure. The drivers therefore avoided making 
errors on these parts of the procedure to escape punishment.  
One driver was quoted in the focus group saying, “The managers expect us to receive 
calls made by passengers. If we do not even register that there is a suspicious item 
on the train then clearly it is a serious lapse that can lead to casualties. Consequently, 
the errant driver can be punished with a fine or temporary suspension from work.”  
4.1.2. Organisational Goals 
Safety 
All the train drivers in the focus groups were unanimous in their belief that safety of 
passengers using the MRS was a primary goal of the organisation. Even minor 
injuries to passengers due to falls from sudden braking or jerky driving were 
considered unacceptable from an organisational point of view. The drivers’ emphasis 
on absolutely safe transit of passengers could be understood as an organisational 
core task (OCT), as discussed by Reiman and Oedewald (2007). The drivers admitted 
that any injury to passengers during operations was considered a serious mishap by 
the managers, and invited personal penalty and disciplinary action in the short term, 
and negative consequences for drivers’ career progression in the longer term. 
While holding that they were responsible for safety of all passengers using the 
system, the drivers felt that their primary responsibility was towards the passengers 
already on board the train, and secondly for those waiting at stations to board the 
train. 
“The company has zero tolerance for even minor injury to passengers using the 
system. All the employees who work in operations have received extensive training 
to prevent injury to passengers. Station managers, and platform teams are 
responsible for passengers waiting for trains. As drivers, every person on board the 
train is our responsibility – if anything untoward happens then we are the ones 
answerable.” 
Security 
The train drivers recognised that like safety, secure transit of passengers was a key 
organisational goal. “The security procedure is performed because the consequences 
of a bomb explosion on a train will be catastrophic. It will cause death and injury to 
passengers, and the result will be very similar to a major incident like a train 
derailment”. The focus groups emphasised that they understood the serious nature 
of meeting security goals because the MRS operated in an environment where there 
was a credible terrorist threat based on past attacks on other rail networks in the city. 
“The presence of guards at the stations is a constant reminder that security of 
passengers is of constant concern to everyone in the system.” 
Service 
Train punctuality was an important operational goal that train drivers are required to 
satisfy in their conventional role (Olsson and Haugland, 2004). If trains were delayed 
on the network, then the whole MRS could be thrown out of schedule, which in turn 
would have negative commercial consequences for the railway company (Borrion et 
al., 2014). Under the train services agreement in place, the train drivers could face 
disciplinary action if they regularly failed to drive according to their schedule. In 
practice, train drivers could be asked for a written explanation if they drove behind 
schedule more than three times a month; during the interviews drivers admitted that 
seven of them had actually been asked to do so by their managers. The importance 
of the punctuality goal was also reflected in the presence of potential financial 
sanctions: drivers’ managers could even lose a part of their monthly income in 
extreme cases. 
One driver described train punctuality as a “basic performance indicator for any train 
driver. Every time we finish a journey around the network behind schedule, we are 
expected to give a written report listing reasons for the delay. The subsequent action 
by the management is taken on basis of the report, and if the reasons given by the 
driver are not found satisfactory then he or she can face disciplinary action. Therefore, 
we aim to remain absolutely punctual in all journeys.” 
 
4.2. Perceived conflict between goals 
It should be stated here that the perception of organisational goals while performing 
the security procedure was not straightforward in actual driving conditions. Analysis 
of data from the focus groups revealed that the train drivers often perceived a conflict 
between security and the other two goals of safety and service. 
4.2.1. Safety-Security Conflict 
Train drivers believed that certain tasks in the security procedure held potentially 
negative consequences for the safety of passengers. This included making an 
announcement to warn passengers of a potential explosive device on the train, and 
increasing the speed of the train to reach the next station quicker. “If I make an 
announcement to warn passengers on the train of a likely explosive device then there 
is a good chance that the passengers may panic. When the train is crowded during 
peak hours, the passengers will try to rush out at the next station which can lead to 
injuries, and even a stampede.” 
“Procedure dictates that I increase the speed of the train so that we reach the next 
station quickly where the suspicious item can be removed from the train. But in reality 
increasing the speed of the train changes all the calculations for braking, and there is 
a risk that the train may not come to a halt at the right spot, stop with a big jerk, and 
in extreme cases even get derailed. All this poses a real risk of injury to passengers.” 
The drivers said in focus groups that the security threat from a suspicious item on the 
train was conditional on its being an actual explosive device – the likelihood of which 
they rated as extremely low. At the same time they felt that the perceived impact from 
carrying out certain security tasks, such as panic amongst passengers, was both 
more immediate and probable. 
The drivers made it clear that they prioritised safety of passengers as their primary 
responsibility even while conducting security procedures. Therefore, when faced with 
a conflict, the drivers preferred not to perform security tasks that they perceived 
negative to passenger safety. 
4.2.2. Service-Security Conflict 
Train drivers emphasised that every time a suspicious item is reported on the train 
the subsequent security procedure to remove it almost always affected the punctuality 
of the train. “At the least, the dwell time at the next platform increases from the 
regulation period of 30 seconds. It always takes more time than that for the station 
team to locate the suspicious item and remove it.” Therefore, the drivers admitted that 
whenever a suspicious item was reported they perceived a negative effect on 
punctuality of the train. “Suspicious items are a headache. The train gets delayed, 
and in my experience it has always been because of something that a passenger 
forgot, and not an actual explosive.” 
4.3. Driving conditions 
Drivers said that the driving conditions in which they received the report of a 
suspicious item had an impact on their conduct of the security procedure. The 
attributes of specific driving conditions that have an impact on the themes discussed 
so far are listed in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 GOES HERE 
4.3.1. Train driving during peak hours of operation 
Drivers identified train driving during peak hours of operation as more stressful than 
driving during non-peak hours. Rail agencies describe peak hours of operation as 
periods running up to three or four hours during the day in which ridership on the 
network is well above passenger demand levels outside this period (Hale and 
Charles, 2009). In the MRS under study, the number of trains operating on the 
network was doubled during peak hours to meet the increased demand from the 
ridership.  
Train drivers identified the following reasons for why they considered driving during 
peak hours as more stressful than non-peak hours. 
Passenger safety 
Large crowds on the network create more chances of injury to passengers on the 
train, waiting at platforms, and while boarding or leaving the train.  “During peak hours 
there are more passengers both on the train, and at the stations. Passengers can get 
injured on the train if we brake suddenly. There may even be fatal incidents at the 
platforms if they are standing beyond the yellow line, and get hit by a train coming in 
too fast. So we have to be very careful while driving.” 
The drivers emphasized that they were reluctant to perform security tasks that they 
perceived as negative to passenger safety during peak hours because of relatively 
large number of passengers on the train during the period. 
Punctuality 
Since the number of trains on the network is doubled during peak hours of operation, 
driving the train on time becomes even more important for the train drivers. “Minor 
departures from the timetable by one train can throw the whole network out of gear, 
adding to time pressure in which the drivers work.”  
Fatigue 
Drivers said in the focus groups that the amount of time they got to rest between two 
train journeys had a bearing upon their fatigue and stress levels. During peak hours 
of operation this rest period was ten to fifteen minutes between two subsequent trips, 
as opposed to twenty-five minutes during non-peak hours.  
“The relatively large number of passengers, time pressure, and reduced time to rest 
makes train driving during peak hours especially stressful. We do not get time to relax 
in the drivers’ room at the end of a round trip. There is just enough time to have a 
drink, and get back to the job. In contrast during off-peak hours we can have tea, chat 
with other drivers, watch some television and rest before going back to the next 
journey.”  In the focus groups the drivers said that owing to additional workload and 
fatigue, there was a greater likelihood that they made mistakes or took shortcuts in 
following a security SOP if a suspicious item was reported during peak hours.  
4.3.2. Train driving during periods of specific warnings about terrorist attacks 
On days that a specific warning was issued about a terrorist attack, the drivers 
believed that there was a greater probability of a suspicious item on the train being 
an actual explosive device than on other days of operation. “There is greater 
awareness of threat on such days because we believe that the likelihood that a 
suspicious item could be an actual explosive, and not a harmless piece of left 
luggage, is more.” 
The change in threat perception of the drivers ties in with the psychometric paradigm 
that hypothesises people’s subjective risk assessment changes with the nature of 
information they are supplied. A specific warning about the likelihood of an attack 
increased its perceived probability in the minds of the drivers (Slovic, 2010).  
The drivers also indicated that they changed their security behaviour when their 
perception of the risk posed by the suspicious item increases. “It is very important on 
such days that we collect all the possible information about a suspicious item on the 
train. Everyone else in the procedure relies on the information we supply to remove 
the item from the train.” 
 
4.4. Effort in performing a task 
Drivers identified that certain parts of a security procedure were cognitively less 
demanding than others. These were tasks that are performed regularly under ordinary 
train driving conditions, and therefore open to practice effect through high frequency 
of mechanical performance.  
‘We open doors of the train at every station. I must have done it thousands of times. 
The only difference during security procedures is that the door is opened not only for 
the passengers, but also for the station team to get on the train to remove the 
suspicious item.’  
The same driver contrasted this frequently performed part of the procedure with the 
less frequent corollary part.  
“The instinct is to close the door after 30 seconds since that is the usual dwell time at 
a station. However, in the security procedure we have to remember to keep the doors 
open until the station team has exited the train. That requires more concentration and 
engagement with the task. I admit that on this part of the procedure I have made 
mistakes, and closed the door without verifying if the station team has exited the train 
or not.” 
 
 
5. Discussion 
SOPs are widely used in railway operations because they are explicit, finite 
instructions that provide detailed prescriptions to the operative staff on what to do in 
response to predicted emergency situations (Hale, 1990). If implemented properly 
security SOPs mitigate the probability of harm to passengers and assets from a 
malicious actor. Poorly implemented strategies on the other hand may result in limited 
risk reduction at best, or can even create new risks that did not exist before (Tripathi 
and Borrion, 2015). 
Contemporary work is often complex because it is dynamic, (Runciman et al., 2007), 
and managers frame rules and procedures for workers in an effort to tame this 
complexity (Sumner and Townsend-Rocchiccioli, 2003). However, the workers may 
view the rules as inconvenient administrative tasks that take time away from achieving 
the real work, and generate their own heuristics to manage uncertainty in the work 
process (Booth and Nelson, 2014; Hale and Borys, 2013). This study was an effort to 
understand strategies adopted by train drivers to manage a security risk while 
performing their primary duty of providing safe, on-time, and comfortable travel to 
their passengers. 
The study showed that drivers take shortcuts in completing certain tasks in the 
security procedure when they work under time constraints, or if a task is perceived to 
have a negative impact on other goals. They feel the pressure of maintaining 
punctuality while performing security tasks. In that sense like safety, drivers perceive 
security too as an “eternal killjoy” (Pietre-Cambacedes and Bouissou, 2013, p 114).  
A key finding of the study was the perceived conflict by train drivers between meeting 
safety and security goals. It emerged in the interviews that the drivers prioritise safety 
of passengers over performance of certain tasks that are listed by the management 
for mitigation of a potential security risk. More so if they perceive a conflict between 
the completion of a security task and safety of passengers on board the train, the 
drivers deliberately choose not to perform the security task.  
The analysis of interview data reveals that the perceived conflict between goals, the 
pressure under which train drivers find themselves, the decisions that they take to 
perform or not perform tasks in the security procedure, and their threat perception are 
contextualised within changing driving conditions. The change in driving conditions 
takes place on a daily basis as hours of operation alter between peak to off-peak 
passenger load. The conditions also change every few months when the drivers are 
informed of a specific terrorist threat to the rail network.  
Recommendations  
The managers could consider relaxing the emphasis on punctuality, and the 
subsequent penalty clauses for train drivers if the train is delayed due to a security 
incident. In practice though, it will be harder for the management to accept delays if 
a large number of suspicious items are reported on the MRS network every day. 
Train operators could also consider improving the realistic nature of driving conditions 
in simulators when drivers train for reports of suspicious items. Drivers who were 
interviewed for this study said that a simulator did not artificially recreate the 
pressures of a realistic driving environment in terms of receiving the reports of a 
potential explosive on the train.  Therefore, even though the simulation environment 
could look convincing for ordinary train driving, and technical tasks associated with it, 
it was not sufficiently realistic to generate the same level of stress and motivational 
pressure (Neale and Liebert, 1986) that would exist with the threat of a potential 
explosive device on board a train. 
In the classroom environment, trainers could emphasise the big picture of trying to 
meet multiple goals in a dynamic, high pressure railway environment. This would 
encourage discussion on prioritisation of goals, and deliberate rule violation by drivers 
to meet the demands of their job. The trainers should also ask drivers to openly state 
if they consider certain parts of a management mandated procedure to be impractical, 
and not implementable in actual driving conditions. This will be in contrast to 
traditional methods of teaching where drivers are expected to learn ideal work 
procedures with an expectation that they will follow them to the letter in working 
conditions. 
Limitations of the study 
The data collected during the study reflected the opinions, prejudices and nuances of 
30 train drivers from a single MRS organisation. To that extent there is a limitation on 
how accurately the views of the participants reflected the reality of train drivers’ 
response to reports of a suspicious item on a train. Moreover, all the drivers who 
participated in the study were relatively young and fresh out of training. Therefore it 
is possible that their views on management of a suspicious item on the train were 
different from older, more seasoned drivers with a longer experience of driving trains 
and responding to a large number of security incidents. 
The focus group format of the interviews facilitated discussion amongst the 
participants, but it suffered from the widely recognised drawbacks of the technique. 
We cannot discount the possibility that some drivers could have resisted giving a 
complete account of the pressures they felt, or the shortcuts they take on the security 
procedure because they wanted to maintain a certain self-image of efficiency in front 
of their peers. The drivers may also have felt the pressure to maintain group 
consensus, agree with their peers and that in turn could have drowned individual 
dissenting views. Therefore, the focus group data used to generate themes for the 
study cannot be considered an exhaustive and completely accurate description of 
train driver behaviour in a dynamic work environment. 
An important part of the focus group interviews was generation of a hypothetical 
scenario that required each participant to imagine the report of a suspicious item on 
the train, and then talk through it. The contribution of participants was dependent on 
how rich an imagery they could generate, and their individual creativity. This may 
have restricted some of the participants from contributing as much as other 
participants who could be more imaginative, and vocal in generating the scenario. 
The result was that the study could have missed out on eliciting exhaustive 
information from some of the participants. 
Cab rides were undertaken as part of the research work, but there was no report of a 
suspicious item during this part of data collection. The researchers had to rely on train 
drivers’ description of a hypothetical security situation, and their views on what they 
would do if they had to perform the security procedure. Again there is a non-negligible 
possibility that the drivers were understating or over-stating their coping strategies. 
Conclusion 
This study presented findings associated with management of a security threat by 
train drivers in real life operational conditions of a MRS. The link between risk 
perception, and subsequent risk mitigation behaviour has been empirically shown to 
exist in many fields, such as nuclear engineering (Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg 1991), 
epidemiology (Setbon et al. 2005), automobile safety (Slovic,1987) and construction 
safety (MacDonald 2006). This is the first study of its kind on risk perception by train 
drivers while dealing with reports of a potential explosive device on the train. 
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Table 1: Overview of the semi-structured focus group interviews 
Class of question Typical content 
General experience 
Challenges 
Driving conditions 
Scenario simulation task 
Utility of security SOP 
Responsibilities 
Motivation 
Seriousness of security threat 
Background, Training 
Fatigue, Workload, Stress, Goal conflict 
Ridership numbers, Roster, Weather 
Report of a suspicious item on a moving train 
Task analysis 
Passenger safety, Management’s demands, Integrity of 
assets 
Salary, Organisational support, Penalty 
Risk assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sources of deductive analysis (with examples in brackets) and accompanying 
inductive findings from data 
Sources of Deductive Analysis for 
Overarching Themes 
 
Inductive Findings from Data 
 
Multiplicity of goals 
 
Complexity Theory (Dekker, 2012; Dekker et al., 
2010; Woods, 2010; Goh et al., 2010) 
 
Studies of train driving (Naweed et al., 2015; 
Naweed, 2013; Branton, 1979) 
 
Organisational studies (Reiman and Oedewald, 
2007; Norros and Nuutinen, 2002; Mitchell and 
Silver, 1990; Thompson and McEwen, 1958) 
 
Conflict between goals 
 
Complexity theory (Dekker, 2011; Dekker et al., 
2010; Goh et al., 2010) 
 
The safety studies literature (Raspotnig and 
Opdahl, 2013; Klein et al., 2010; Hollnagel and 
Woods, 2005; Stanton and Walker, 2011 
Dörner, 1983; Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-
Cirocco, 1986;) 
 
Models of train driving process (Hamilton and 
Clarke, 2005; 
 
Studies of train driver response to SPAD 
(Naweed et al., 2013; Naweed and 
Balakrishnan, 2012) 
 
Influence of situational factors 
 
Critical Decision Making model (Cooke, 1994; 
Klein et al., 1986) 
 
 
Effort in performing task 
Practice Effect (Scmidt & Bjork, 1992; Baddeley 
and Longman, 1978; Guthrie, 1952) 
 
 
 
Safety goals 
 
Security goals 
 
Service goals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security – Safety conflict 
 
Security –Service conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peak-hour operations 
Information of a specific threat 
 
 
 
Some tasks in security procedure are universal 
to train driving and gain from practice effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Attributes of different driving conditions 
Peak/Off-Peak Alert/Non-Alert 
 Number of passengers on the train 
 Number of passengers at the stations 
 Number of trains operating on the network 
 Amount of rest period for train drivers 
(Roster) 
 Monitoring by the management of service 
goals 
 Pressure of meeting service goals 
 Likelihood of threat 
 Consequences of making errors in 
security procedure 
 Presence of security personnel on 
the network (increased visibility of 
threat mitigation strategies) 
 Monitoring by the management of 
security goals 
 Pressure of meeting security goals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Key Themes for Managing Reports of Suspicious Items on a 
Moving Train (items identified in interviews in italics) 
 
1) Goals of the drivers in conducting the security procedure 
 
Individual Goals (Penalty for delay, Pride in job, Monitoring by        
management)      
 
Organisational Goals (Management’s goals)  
Safety (Crowd on train, Crowd at stations, Announcements, Passengers 
beyond the Yellow Line)    
Security (Suspicious item removed, Explosives, Gathering information, 
Reporting of incident)  
Service (Closing train doors, Dwell time, Jerk less driving, Overshooting 
platform, Punctuality) 
 
2) Perceived conflict between goals 
 
Security-Safety Conflict (Panic caused by announcements, Panic amongst 
passengers, Safety concern created by tasks, Speed of train)  
Security-Punctuality Conflict  
 
3) Conditions in which the security procedure was expected to be performed (Weather, 
Day or night, Track visibility, Track obstructions, Temperature) 
 
Train driving during peak hours (Length of duty break, Distance between 
trains, Following minimal SOP, Roster, Increased stress)  
Train driving during periods of specific warnings about terrorist attacks 
(Threat perception) 
 
4) Perceived effort in performing the task (Task complexity, Task conflict, Task practice
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